Richard Brown and Keith Frankish on Qualia.

Richard Brown & Keith Frankish (by Philosophy TV)

Richard Brown (left) and Keith Frankish (right) on qualia.

Suppose you’re a physicalist and you want to include qualia in your ontology. Unfortunately, “classic qualia” (intrinsic, ineffable, private properties of experience) seem incompatible with physicalism, while “zero qualia” (mere dispositions to judge that we have classic qualia) don’t seem like genuine qualia at all. After all, even zombies have zero qualia! Perhaps you can be satisfied with “diet qualia” (subjective feels of experience). But are there meaningful distinctions between diet qualia and the other two conceptions? Is the notion of diet qualia even coherent? Frankish and Brown discuss the issue.

Keith Frankish on the Hard Problem and the Illusion of Qualia – philosophybites podcast


Related works

by Brown:
“Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism” (2010)
“The Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness” (draft)

by Frankish:
“Quining Diet Qualia” (forthcoming)
“The Anti-Zombie Argument” (2007)
Consciousness (2005)

See also:
Guest posts by Frankish at the Splintered Mind


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