THIS BOOK has no footnotes. Most of the information ordinarily given in footnotes will be found in the Bibliography. Freud, for example, is quoted in section 57, and the Bibliography furnishes full data on the source, followed by a parenthesis: (57: p. 34 f.), which means that the quotation in section 57 comes from p. 34 f. When a work is cited in several sections, the references in the parentheses are separated by semicolons.
The reason for this unorthodox system is that it is easier to locate an author in an alphabetically arranged bibliography than it would be to find him in the notes at the end of the book. This way the reader does not have to remember on what page Freud was quoted, nor does he have to interrupt his reading to be sure of finding the reference. The Bibliography supplements the Index. The Notes contain only material that could not easily be incorporated in the Bibliography, and the system just described has made it possible to hold them down to a few pages. Altogether, I have tried hard to keep the Notes and Bibliography short.
Translations from the German are my own even when English versions are listed, too, for the reader’s convenience.
- An asterisk indicates a note that offers some further discussion. Readers may find it convenient to glance at these notes after finishing a chapter.
Kant’s “autonomy” and a little “depth philosophy”
§ 1: Kant introduced the term “autonomy” into ethics, but the ideal is far older. The Stoics sought moral autonomy, and so did the Cynics even earlier. These “post-Socratics” associated liberation with independence from desire and therefore believed that it was essential to have few desires and no passions. Kant still stands in this tradition; and he was autonomous y his own lights.
He considered it the ma of autonomy that one’s actions are not prompted by any inclination whatsoever but by a maxim of which one could wish that it might become universal law. This notion has elicited a large literature, and I have dealt with it at some length in The Faith of a Heretic, § 77. Now it must suffice if I can suggest briefly how Kant’s conception of autonomy was misguided. By considering his “autonomy” in action, we can “see at a glance what is borne out by a careful analysis of his works. on ethics.
Not everybody acts according to maxims, but Kant did. Why did he? A few months after Kant’s death, R. B. Jachmann, who had known him well and whom Kant had actually asked to write his biography, published a memoir, Immanuel Kant Described in Letters to a Friend. I turn to the seventh letter: “Perhaps smoking tobacco was his supreme sensual pleasure, but he had adopted the maxim to smoke only one full clay pipe a day, because he did not see where he should stop otherwise.”
Kant suffered from constipation, and a physician prescribed a daily pill. When the effectiveness of the pill diminished, he doubled the dosage on the advice of another doctor. “But no sooner had this happened than Kant reflected that this increase would have no end, and he formulated a maxim for himself never to take, as long as he lived, more than two pills a day.” Late in his life, when his doctors wished him to take more pills, he refused to deviate from his maxim. “As soon as he had adopted such a maxim, . . . nothing in the world could have made him abandon it.”
Jachmann’s attitude is rather worshipful; he admires Kant’s firmness; and the illustrations are introduced thus: “By and by his whole life had become a chain of maxims that eventually formed a firm system of character.” And Jachmann concludes: “In this way he had eventually tied his whole way of thinking and living to rules of reason to which he remained as loyal in the smallest circumstances as in the most important matters. . . . His will was free, for it depended on his law of reason. All attempts by others to subdue his will and guide it differently were in vain. . . . He persisted in the duty that he had imposed on himself.”
Clearly, Kant’s conception of rationality was untenable. A maxim that can be universalized is not necessarily rational. And a person whose life is governed by scores of duties that he has imposed on himself is hardly a paradigm of autonomy.
Socrates did not depend on alcohol. He could take it or leave it. He did not need a maxim to stop after the second glass of wine. When the wine and conversation were good, he went on drinking until everybody else had passed out and then, at dawn, left the symposium, took a bath, and spent the rest of the day as he usually, did.
The exclusively microscopic approach favored by so many scholars gives one no depth of vision at all. What I call “depth philosophy,” following the example of “depth psychology,” makes it easier to perceive radical alternatives-for example, to a morality of maxims and principles. What I mean by “depth philosophy” is a philosophy that does not rest content with analyses of words or concepts but inquires into the concrete human realities behind various philosophical positions. Specifically, one does not have to be either a slave of one’s inclinations or “a man of maxims,” to use Jachmann’s apt phrase.
The central problem of Kant’s ethics (no less than of his Critique of Pure Reason) was to escape from determinism. He called all motivation that was not totally free of inclination “pathological,” and he believed that as long as our motivation was pathological we were unfree. Only behavior determined solely by reason was free, and it was only when obeying a law one had imposed on oneself that one was autonomous, provided that this law was wholly rational and not stained by inclination. The test of that was whether the law could be made universal and applied to all men. Thus Kant’s rigorism seemed essential to him. As long as one always gets up at 5 a.m. (as Kant did), regardless of all inclinations, or as long as one never takes more than two pills a day, no matter what consequences are invoked by others, one is free, Kant thought. But as soon as one heeds one’s inclinations or appeals to consequences, one re-enters the realm of causal determinism and of “heteronomy.”
Kant’s psychology was superficial. The procedure he recommended could well be “pathologica1.” It is certainly decidophobic. I am not trying to explain Kant’s ethics psychologically. For my present purpose it is just as well if his ethics came first and he then put it into practice. I believe that, as Jachmann put it in his sixth letter, “Kant lived as he taught.” But even if the stories cited here were apocryphal and if Kant himself had been a libertine, these illustrations would still show how Kant’s conceptions of autonomy and rationality were misguided.
I agree that autonomy depends on rationality. But rationality is incompatible with a rigorous refusal to listen to reason. Autonomy requires deliberate attention to objections and alternatives. If anything can liberate us from cultural determination, that can. But there is no need here for an analysis of determinism. The difference between those who give deliberate attention to objections and alternatives and those who do not is sufficiently important to be stressed and worked out in detai1.
§§ 2 and 6: For existentialism, cf. Kaufmann, 1959, especially the chapters on Kierkegaard and Heidegger. For Heidegger’s relation to the Nazis, see also Heidegger, 1933, and Schneeberger, 1962. The Heidegger quotation in §6, about using force, is from his 1953, page 124.
§ 4: “The We-We orientation”: See. Buber, 1923. In the Prologue to the English translation, pages 11-14, I present five attitudes in which there is no You: I-I, I-It, It-It, We-We, and Us-Them.
§ 7: For Manichaean thinking, cf. Kaufmann, 1969 and 1970.
I have made some use of material first presented there. For Greek tragedy, cf. Kaufmann, 1968. For Hegel, ibid.
- A Note on Solzhenitsyn
§ 9: For the confrontation with the Soviet Writers’ Secretariat, see either Solzhenitsyn, ed. Labedz, or the Appendix of Cancer Ward. The quotation about “Tolstoyan philosophy” is found in Burg and Feifer, 1972; the detractor was Dmitri Eremin. The image of Solzhenitsyn that emerges from the Burg and Feifer biography is consistent with my view of him, but my interpretations are based exclusively on his own works and on the admirable “Documentary Record,” edited by Labedz. H. T. Willett’s somewhat different rendering of Solzhenitsyn’s remark about the mice and cockroaches is equally to my purpose: “But I got used to it because there was nothing evil in it, nothing dishonest. Rustling was life to them.”
§ 11: For the Nietzsche epigram see Kaufmann’s Nietzsche, page 19.
§ 13: For Marx and justice, see also Wood, 1972.
§ 14: First sentence: see Reiwald, page 16. Regarding 1694, see Megarry, page 182. Regarding 1770, 1832, and 1837, see Reiwald, page 16f.
Reiwald on talio: pages 268f. and 273. Cf. also 18. Scholarly references in support of the long quotation: page 294, note 17; also Kaufmann, 1961, § 49.
The Gospel quotation is from Matthew 10: 14f.; cf. Luke 10: 10ff. For a fuller discussion of these aspects of the New Testament, see Kaufmann, 1958, chapters 6-8, and 1961, chapter 8.
§ 16: the nineteenth-century philosopher is Green, 1895, page 184.
§ 17: for point 6, cf. Freud, 1913, Werke, IX, page 89.
§ 20: the two penologists are Gauthier and Robert Meindl; the quotations are from Reiwald, page 189.
§ 21: for poena, see Mommsen, 1899, page 13; cf. pages 14, 899.
- Notes on Rawls
§ 22: For the differences between justice and fairness see also Chapman, 1963. Rawls, 1971, page 12f., defends himself by saying that” ‘justice as fairness’ . . . does not mean that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same, any more than the phrase ‘poetry as metaphor’ means that the concepts of poetry and metaphor are the same.” But this terse remark does not help much to explain the difference between two key concepts.
One of the differences between justice and fairness is illustrated by one of Rawls’s own examples: “. . . gambling. If a number of persons engage in a series of fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last bet is fair, or at least not unfair, whatever the distribution is” (page 86). But we should not call it “just.”
Rawls’s chapter 1 is entitled “Justice as Fairness,” and the phrase recurs throughout.
§ 29: For a fuller account and critique of Hume, see Kaufmann, December 1969. Hume’s association of justice with “possessions” and “the love of gain” was so close and at the same time so misguided that it seems to call for psychological, historical, or sociological explanations.
Page references for the Rawls quotations: “moral geometry” (121); “everyone’s advantage” and “Injustice” (62 et passim); “For simplicity” (408n); “Rome or Paris” (412. cf. 551); “To say that” (138); “We want to” (141).
Rawls’s exceptional intelligence and subtlety and his tireless attention to detail may give the impression that we are confronted with such a tightly woven theory that every objection is taken care of somewhere. In fact, the book is quite uneven, and the discussion of guilt in § § 70-74, for example, seems rather ill-considered. To mention at least one point, Rawls seems to suppose that “a greater feeling of guilt implies a greater fault” (page 475).
Occasional asides in Rawls’s book come much closer to my position than do the passages quoted in the text; for example, this staggering concession: “It is too much to suppose that there exists for all or even most moral problems a reasonable solution. Perhaps only a few can be satisfactorily answered” (page 89f.). I welcome such agreement, but it would be naive to suppose that I must be right because another author says something similar. What autonomy requires is attention to significant alternatives to our own views. Hence I have concentrated on the moral rationalism that is the central motif of A Theory of Justice.
How hard even philosophers find it to see through moral rationalism is suggested by Stuart Hampshire’s review-article (1972): “If our moral beliefs on many subjects, and in many very different situations, are shown to be instances of a few general principles at work, then we have an assurance that our moral beliefs have a rational foundation.” This is surely wrong. Omit the word “moral” both times and think of $1. Thomas or some Muslim scholastic; did any scholastic ever show that the beliefs of his community had “a rational foundation”? Hampshire himself immediately retracts his claim in the next sentence: “At least they are not just a chaos and a jumble: there is a reason why we hold the various beliefs that we do.” The first half of this qualification is trivially true, the second half again false. What scholastics do is to bring a complex, Gothic order into chaos, beginning with “a few general principles” and then adding to these as need arises. But the reasons why people actually hold various beliefs usually have little to do with the scholastics’ ingenuity. Actually, Hampshire does not finally accept Rawls’s rationalism: some version of “intuitionism seems to me nearer to adequacy than Professor Rawls’s social contract theory.” Hampshire favors “perfectionism”: “having a picture of the wholly admirable man, and of an entirely desirable and admirable way of life.” This is much closer to the present book.
Regarding my “final criticism” that “the cards are stacked”: After finishing this book I read in manuscript Robert Nozick’s critique of Rawls in his forthcoming book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. He shows at length how the cards are stacked, how Rawls’s second principle of justice is not at all particularly rational, and how Rawls’s “original position” is an inappropriate model for thinking about how the things people produce are to be distributed. Nozick devotes far more space to Rawls than I do and raises many other points. The one most pertinent to my concerns is surely his attempt to show that Rawls is in effect “denigrating a person’s autonomy.”
Finally, it seems to me that A Theory of Justice invites comparison with Ralph Barton Perry’s General Theory of Value (1926). Rawls’s references to Perry show that he is not unaware of this. In a lengthier discussion this point would be worth pursuing. Here it must suffice to note that a generation ago many philosophers believed that Perry had virtually created a new branch of philosophy. In fact, however, general theory of value had no future. Those who expect a renewal of moral and political philosophy from A Theory of Justice overlook that, notwithstanding the author’s many virtues, justice has no future.
§ 30: Solomon’s judgment: I Kings 3.
The quotation in the final paragraph is from Gerard Manley Hopkins.
§ 35: Satan is quoted from Kaufmann, 1958, § 59.
§ 36: Characterization of Tertullian opens the article on him in Encyclopaedia Britannica, eleventh edition.
- A Note on Guilt and Aggression
Guilt will be discussed at length in the next chapter, but this is the place for a brief remark about the theory regarding the origin of the bad conscience advanced by Nietzsche in 1887 and revived by Freud in 1931 and 1933. They claimed that aggression, denied outward expression, turns inward against oneself. This is a profound insight, but this is not the origin of the notion of guilt. I have tried to show how this notion is born; but once a person has the notion that he is guilty, this idea provides a channel for the discharge of inhibited aggression. Cf. my analysis of the institution of punishment in § 17; punishment does not owe its origin to aggression, but it certainly provides an outlet for aggression.
§ 39: I first developed my concept of humbition and the three other cardinal virtues in Kaufmann, 1961, § 83ff.
- Spinoza and “the bite of conscience”
§ 41: Spinoza repudiated the bite of conscience (conscientiae morsus) but defined it rather implausibly as “pain accompanied by the idea of something past that has had a result contrary to our hope” (Ethics, Definitions at the end of Book III, 17; cf. III. 18, Scholium 2). This comes closer to a cynical bon mot than to a genuine understanding of the bad conscience, and it is understandable, though unjustifiable, that many interpreters, and even the standard English translation, render conscientiae morsus as “disappointment.”
Later on (IV. 54 ) Spinoza says that poenitentia is no virtue because it does not issue from reason, but “as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction” because “those who are prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason.” (Cf. also IV.4 7.) In sum, Spinoza repudiated the traditional Christian view of guilt feelings, but he did not come close to the view developed in the present book.
§ 44: The Painted Bird is by Jerzy Kosinski, Night by Elie Wiesel, and The First Circle and Cancer Ward are by Alexander Solzhenitsyn.
What is said in the text applies also in full measure to the work of Heinrich Boll-as much to some of his very short stories as to his novels.
- A Note on Dreams
Third paragraph from end: Self-punishment in dreams poses a serious problem for Freud’s thesis that all dreams are to be explained as wish fulfilments. His epic struggle with dreams of this sort began with his discussion of dreams in which we fail examinations (1900: page IS8f.). In the last edition of his Traumdeutung he expanded this discussion and incorporated some new ideas (Werke, pages 280-282). He noted that the tests we fail in dreams are always tests in which we have done very well in real life, never tests we have actually failed. More important, he added another section in which he said expressly:
“I could not object if one distinguished dreams of this type [not examination dreams but dreams in which we are far worse off than we are in real life-especially dreams that take us back to early hardships] as punishment dreams from our wish-fulfilment dreams.”
But then he added in a footnote: “It is easy to recognize in these punishment dreams wish fulfillments of the superego” (page 479f.). So far, my comments are compatible with Freud’s theory without committing me to it. But Freud does not suggest, as I do, that some of us have a lingering feeling that we do not deserve to be so successful in a world in which so many others are so miserable.
Consider two recurrent dreams. A professor who is a very successful lecturer dreams now and again that people walk out on his lectures. A woman who has an enviable reputation as a hostess and a cook and always has an abundance of food left over after every party dreams occasionally of giving one at which there is not enough food, while people she does not remember inviting keep arriving. If one knows independently that both have an articulate social conscience and that the woman is troubled by the fact that millions are starving, my interpretation seems the most plausible.
§ 46: After the third error: “Occasionally. . . ‘total”’: see, e.g., Fromm, 1955, p. 124.
For a more detailed account of the way in which “alienation” became popular, see Kaufmann’s essay in Schacht, 1970. In the present chapter I have made some use of parts of this essay, but much of the material, including all of §§ 58 and 59, is entirely new. For a detailed account of “alienation” in Hegel, Marx, Fromm, and twentieth-century sociology, see Schacht, 1970.
- Marx and Fourier
§ 49: Marx’s dream, quoted from The German Ideology, was influenced by Charles Fourier, 1845, page 68. Fourier had pointed out that what makes labor a tedious torment is that workers have to spend long, consecutive hours at the same occupation. He had proposed a commune in which the “Harmonians” would never spend more than, at most, two hours at one job, and he had constructed schedules for two “Harmonians, one poor and one rich.” Marx was influenced by the schedule for the rich:
“Hours sleep from 10:30 P.M. till 3 A.M.
3 :30 rise, preparations
. . .
5:30 with the hunting group
7 with the fishing group
8 breakfast, newspapers
9 agriculture, greenhouse
. . .
9:30 court of the arts, concert, ball, theater, receptions
10:30 to bed
Marx introduced not only the notion of rearing cattle in the evening but also – importantly – the phrase “as I please.” He opposed regimentation and prized spontaneity and autonomy.
- A Note on “Depth Philosophy”
§ 54: About half of the data in the penultimate paragraph were originally brought to my attention in another context by Ben-Ami Scharfstein. The phrase “symptoms of mental alienation” comes from the article on Schopenhauer ill the Encyclopaedia Britannica, eleventh edition. But it was surprisingly difficult to establish most of these facts.
Even in biographies of philosophers their mothers are rarely more than mentioned! The fathers are mentioned more often-usually in connection with the sons’ education. The character and attitudes of a mother or her death during a future philosopher’s childhood are widely considered irrelevant. The tradition that shapes works of this sort has been molded by an absurd male chauvinism and a mixture of psychological obtuseness with hostility to any attempt at psychological understanding.
What accounts for this hostility? Decidophobia. No similar hostility exists in the case of artists and writers. But as soon as we see the great philosophers as men who did not feel “very reliably at home in the interpreted world” and who reacted in various ways to a deep sense of alienation, the history of philosophy confronts us with alternatives and the challenge to make choices. Of course, we need not choose one of the philosophies found in a book; we might try to develop views of our own. But that possibility only adds to the horror. Nonphilosophers prefer to write off philosophy as “too deep,” while philosophers seek safety in microscopism. They pick out a sentence, a claim, or an argument and examine that, carefully. Biographies of great philosophers are felt to be irrelevant, but barely tolerated as long as they really remain irrelevant and concentrate on trivia. The microscopist depends on abstraction and avoids any possibility of confrontation with the philosophers of the past as living alternatives.
Of course, the page in the text, above, does no more than open up one line of questioning. Here is another: Wittgenstein, whose influence dominated English-speaking philosophy for a quarter of a century, lost neither of his parents in childhood, but three of his brothers committed suicide (Hans in 1902, Rudolf in 1904, and Kurt in 1918: see Bartley, 1973).
§ 57: “Compact majority” in the Freud quotation is a phrase from Ibsen’s Enemy of the People (Volksfeind in German) and thus ties in very well with Freud’s references to the Volk.
§ 59: For love of the stranger see Leviticus 19.34 and Deuteronomy 10.19. Cf. Exodus 12.49,20.10,22.21,23.9, Leviticus 24.22, Numbers 15.15, and Deuteronomy 5.14. For Samuel see I Samuel 8.
§ 60: for justice as health of the soul, see Plato’s Republic 444. For some recent scholarly discussions of Plato’s argument at that point, see Vlastos (1971), essays 2-5.
§ 66, second paragraph, on existentialism and resoluteness: see, e.g., Heidegger, 1927, §§ 46ff., especially the two chapters on “Das mogliche Ganzseinkonnen des Daseins . . .” and “Das eigentliche Ganzseinkonnen des Daseins . . .”; e.g., the sentence in § 62 (p. 309), emphasized by Heidegger himself: “The question about being able to be whole is factual-existential. Being-there answers it in resoluteness.” What is different from the classical integrity is the emphasis on temporality and the wholeness not only of the person but also of his life.’
§ 68: for a detailed discussion of different dimensions of meaning, see Kaufmann, 1966, page 33ff.
§ 69, first paragraph: “Job is usually seen differently.” Glatzer, 1969, includes over thirty interpretations of Job, and considers mine (reprinted from Kaufmann, 1961) “one of the boldest and most incisive and sensitive,” partly because it stresses points “carefully avoided by theological moralists” (page 237). It would be immodest to quote this here if there were a better way of establishing the point made in the text.
§ 70: The first sentence harks back to the beginning of this book.
§ 73: Buddha and Mara: Jataka, I, 63. 271; quoted in Söder-blom,1933.
§ 77: Moses’ “as yourself”: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” and “The stranger. . . shall be to you as the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself” (Leviticus 19: 18 and 34).
§ 80: The sentence quoted from Marx is the last of his eleven “Theses on Feuerbach,” which are included, e.g., in Marx’s Frith. schriften and in Tucker, 1972.
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For an exposition and critique of Hume’s view, see Kaufmann, 1969.
Jachmann, Reinhold Bernhard. Immanuel Kant geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund; Konigsberg: Nicolovius, 1804. Reprinted in Immanuel Kant: Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen / Die Biographien von L. E. Borowski, R. B. lachmann und A. Ch. Wasianski. Berlin: Deutsche Biblothek. n.d., preface dated June 1912 (1 n).
Jaspers, Karl. Die Schuldfrage. Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, and Zurich: Artemis, 1946. English: The Question of German Guilt. Translated by E. B. Ashton. New York: The Dial Press, 1947 (37).
Jefferson, Thomas. “A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments” 1779. In The Complete Jefferson; Containing his Major Writings, Published and Unpublished, except his Letters. Edited by Saul K. Padover. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943 (13: pp. 90-102).
––––––––. The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Adrienne Koch and William Peden. New York: Modern Library, 1944 (13: p. 683, on Napoleon).
Job. (60: 2.3, 2.9, 27.5; 63: 27.5; 69: 27.5.)
Kafka, Franz. Brief an den Vater, written in 1919 and published posthumously in Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem Lande und andere Prosa aus dem Nachlass. New York: Schocken Books, 1953 (31: p. 182 f.).
Kant, Immanuel. Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufkliirung. 1784. Gesammelte Schriften. Edited by Konigl. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 8 (69: 1st parag., i.e., p. 35).
––––––––. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. 1788. Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5 (13: pp. 124 ff., i.e., bk. II, chap. II, sec. V; 69: “Duty” on p. 86, i.e., bk. I, chap. III, and “the Moral Law” on p. 161 f., i.e., Conclusion).
––––––––. Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechtslehre. 1797. Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6 (13 and 14: § 49 E). The translation mentioned in the text is The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Translated by John Ladd. Indianapolis & N.Y. & Kansas City: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1965. Translations in the text are the author’s.
Kaufmann, Walter. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. 3d ed., revised and enlarged, Princeton University Press; New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1968 (11).
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––––––––. Tragedy and Philosophy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968. Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969 (7 n; 56: chap. VII).
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––––––––. “Black and White.” In Survey: A lournal of Soviet and East European Studies. Autumn, 1969. Also under the title “Beyond Black and White: A Plea for Thinking in Color” in Midway. 10.3. Winter 1970 (7 n).
Kierkegaard, Soren. The Concept of Dread. 1844. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946 (2: p.55).
Kosinski, Jerzy. The Painted Bird. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. New York: Pocket Books, 1966 (44 n; 53: p. 44 ff.).
Lindbergh, Anne Morrow. The Wave of the Future, a Confession of Faith. New York: Harcourt, 1940 (9).
Lukacs, Georg. Der junge Hegel und die Probleme der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft. Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1948. Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1954 (46).
Marcuse, Herbert. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. 2d ed. 1955 (46).
––––––––. Eros and Civilization. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955 (46).
––––––––. “Repressive Tolerance.” In A Critique of Pure Tolerance (three essays) by Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse. Boston: Beacon Press, 1965 (8: pp. 85, 94, 100, 10 1 ) .
Marx, Karl. Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 1927 ff.
This is considered the standard edition and usually cited as MEGA. The previously unpublished early manuscripts appeared in vol. 3 in 1932. The first popular edition of these writings was Die Fruhschriften, edited by Siegfried Landshut. Stuttgart: Kroner, 1955 (46 ff.; 80).
––––––––. Zur ludenfrage. 1843. Edition of Siegfried Landshut, pp. 171-99 and 199-207 (58: all quotations are from part II, pp. 199 ff.) Different English translations in Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967, and in Tucker, 1’972.
––––––––. “Die entfremdete Arbeit.” In Karl Marx: Texte zu Methode und Praxis, vol. 2: Pariser Manuskripte 1844. Edited by Gunther Hillmann. Rowohlt. 1966. pp. 50-63 (50: p. 54). English translation in Tucker, 1972, p. 59.
––––––––. Die deutsche Ideologie. Edited by V. Adoratskij. Vienna and Berlin: Verlag fUr Literatur und Politik, 1932 (49: p. 22 f). The quoted passage is also included in Landshut ed., p. 361; and an English version of it in Tucker, 1972, p. 124).
––––––––. Manifest der kommunistischen Partei. 1848. (47: Landshuted., p. 552, i.e., III.1.c. English translation in Tucker, 1972).
––––––––. Das Kapital, vol. 1. 1867 (50: “the expropriators,” 3d paragraph from the end of chapter 24) .
Megarry, R. E. Miscellany-at-Law; a Diversion for Lawyers and Others. London: Stevens. 1958 (14 n).
Meyer, Eduard. Geschichte des Altertums. Erster Band. Erste Haelfte. 3d ed. Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1910 (58: pp. 227-30).
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. 1863 (32).
For a detailed exposition and critique of his ideas about the origin of justice, see Kaufmann, 1969.
Mishnah. (60: Berakhot, IX.5.)
Mommsen, Theodor. Romisches Strafrecht. Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1899 (21 n).
Morning Herald. January 28, 1804. Quoted by Andrews, 1890, 84 f., whose chapter on “The Pillory” contains many similar reports (16).
Mo-tze. The Ethical and Political Works of Motse. translated by Yi-pao Mei. London, Probsthain, 1929 (29: “major calamities”: chapter XVI. The passages on music are quoted by Fung Yulan, A History of Chinese Philosophy. Translated by Derk Bodde, vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, pp. 86 f., 89 f., 104 f.).
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, The Modern Library, 1968 (33: p. 511 f., i.e., Genealogy of Morals, II, section 11; 36: p. 485 fl., i.e., Genealogy of Morals, I, section 15; 36 n: p. 520 fl., i.e., Genealogy of Morals, II, section 16 fl.).
––––––––. The Portable Nietzsche. Translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann. New York: The Viking Press, 1954 (4: p. 640, i.e., The Antichrist, section 55; 25: p. 258, i.e., Zarathustra II, last chapter, “doves’ feet”; 37: p. 576, i.e., The Antichrist, section 10; 72: p. 129 f., i.e., Zarathustra, Prologue, section 5).
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974 (29 n).
Perry, Ralph Barton. General Theory of Value. New York: Longmans, Green, 1926 (29 n).
Pius XII, Pope. “International Penal Law: Address to the Sixth International Congress of Penal Law, October 3, 1953.” In The Catholic Mind, February 1954 (16).
Plato. Gorgias (54, 2nd parag.: Soma, serna. 493, d. also Cratylus, 400).
––––––––. Republic (44: 571; 54, first paragraph: 473, 592, 555 fl.; 73: 583).
––––––––. Theaetetus (54, “wonder”: 155).
Rawls, John. A Theory of lustice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971 (12: p. 314 f.; 20: p. 315; 21 n; 29 n).
Reich, Charles. The Greening of America. New York: Random House, 1970. New York: Bantam Books, 1971 (11: 1971 ed. pp. 318, 374, and 377).
Reiwald, Paul. Die Gesellschaft und Ihre Verbrecher. Zurich: Pan Verlag, 1948. Society and its Criminals. Translated and edited by T. E. James. London: Heinemann, 1949 (14, 20 n).
Sartre, Jean Paul. L’Etre et Ie Neant. Paris: Gallimard, 1943. Translated as Being and Nothingness by Hazel Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library. 1956 (2: French ed., p. 515, translation, p. 439; 49: translation p. 59, also in Kaufmann, 1956, p. 256).
––––––––. Les Mouches. Paris: Gallimard, 1943. The Flies. Translated by Stuart Gilbert. New York: Knopf, 1947 (39).
For a discussion of the play, see Kaufmann, 1968, section 51.
––––––––. L’Existentialisme est un Humanisme. Paris: Editions Nagel, 1946. Translated as Existentialism and Humanism by Philip Mairet. London: Methuen, 1946. The discussion after the lecture: pp. 57-70. The lecture itself is included, uncut, in Kaufmann, 1956 (6).
––––––––. “Portrait of the Anti-Semite” in Kaufmann, 1956. Translated by Mary Guggenheim from Refiexions sur la question luive. Paris: Morihien, 1946 (4; 63).
––––––––. Question de Methode. Paris: Gallimard, 1960. Translated as Search for a Method by Hazel Barnes. New York: Knopf, 1963 (9: p. xxxiv, preface; and p. 30; cf. p. 7 f.). For the authority of history, see also Sartre, “Reply to Albert Camus” (Les Temps Modernes, 1952) and “Merleau-Ponty” (ibid., 1961). In Situations. New York: George Braziller, 1965.
––––––––. “Merleau-Ponty.” In Les Temps Modernes, 1961. Reprinted in Situations. Translated by Benita Eisler. New York: Braziller, 1965 (6, 45: “Russia. . .” p. 266; “the right to . . . Marxists,” p. 257; 45: p. 266).
––––––––. L’Idiot de la famille; Gustave Flaubert de 1821-1857. Paris: Gallimard, 1971. 2 vols., 2136 pages! Two more volumes are to follow (29).
Schacht, Richard L. Alienation with an Introductory Essay by Walter Kaufmann. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1971 (46 n).
Schneeberger, Guido. Nachlese zu Heidegger. Bern: Buchdruckerei AG, Suhr, 1962 (2 n, 6 n).
Shakespeare, William. Hamlet (39: II.2.1. 178 f.).
Soderblom, Nathan. The Living God. The Gifford Lectures . . .
1931. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1933 (73 n: p. 89).
Solzhenitsyn, Alexander. One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.
Translated by Max Hayward and Ronald Hingley. New York:
Praeger, 1963. New York: Bantam Books, 1963 (9).
––––––––. “Matryona’s House” in “We Never Make Mistakes”: Two Short Novels. Translated by Paul W. Blackstock. Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1963. New York: Norton, 1971. Translated by H. T. Willett, in Encounter, May 1963, and in Half-way to the Moon: New Writing from Russia, edited by Patricia Blake and Max Hayward. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964 (9).
––––––––. The First Circle. Translated by Thomas P. Whitney. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. New York: Bantam Books, 1969 (9; 11; 44).
––––––––.Cancer Ward. Translated by Nicholas Bethell and David Burg. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1969. New York: Bantam Books, 1969 (9; 9 n; 11; 44).
––––––––. Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record. Edited by Leopold Labedz. New York;.: Harper & Row, 1971 (9 n; 11).
––––––––. August 1914. Translated by Michael Glenny. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1972 (9,11).
––––––––. Nobel Lecture in The New York Times, September 30 and October 7, 1972 (78,79).
Sophocles. Oedipus Tyrannus. For a full-length interpretation see Kaufmann, 1968, chapter N.
Spinoza. Ethics (41 n). Tappan, Paul W. Crime, Justice and Correction. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960 (16).
Tertullian. On Spectacles in The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325. Edited by the Reverend Alexander Roberts, D.D., and James Donaldson, LL.D., in vol. 3, Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian, American reprint of the Edinburgh Edition. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1957 (36).
Theognis. (12: line 147 f.).
Thucydides. (69: 1.20 conclusion) .
Tucker, Robert C. “Marx and Distributive Justice,” in Justice. Nomos VI. New York: Atherton, 1963. Also in Tucker’s The Marxian Revolutionary Idea. New York: Norton, 1969 (13).
––––––––, ed. The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: Norton, 1972. See Marx.
Vlastos, Gregory, ed. Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, II. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1971 (60 n).
Watson, John B. Psychological Care of Infant and Child. New York: Norton, 1928 (1).
Weber, Max. Wissenschaft als Beruf. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1919 (76: pp. 10, 14). Translations mine, italics in the original. Complete translation in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. 1946.
For a detailed .critique of Weber’s lecture see Kaufmann’s “Ketzerei in der Erziehung” in Club Voltaire, vol. 2, edited by Gerhard Szczesny. Munich. 1965, pp. 303-14.
Wood, Allen W. “The Marxian Critique of Justice.” In Philosophy & Public Affairs. vol. 1, no. 3. Spring 1972 (13 n).